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[L. A. No. 25234. In Bank. July 26,1960.] 
STAR-KIST FOODS, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, v. 
JOHN R. QUINN, as County Tax Assessor, etc., et aI., 
Appellants. 
[1] Taxation-Remedies of Taxpayers-Conditions of Relief.-
Ordinarily, a taxpayer seeking" relief from an erroneous assel's-
ment must exhaust available administrative remedies before 
resorting to the courts. Prior application to the local board of 
equalization is not required, however, in certain cases where the 
facts are undisputed and the property assessed is tax-exempt, 
outside the jurisdiction or nonexistent. 
[2] ld.-Remedies of Taxpayer-Grounds for Relief.-While ill 
one sense almost any mistake which results in nn excessive 
assessment amounts to nn overvaluation of the property of a 
taxpayer, there is a real and distinct difference between those 
cases in which it Dlay properly be said that the error is one 
of overvaluation and those in which the overvaluation is a 
[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 268; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 1161 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4,6] Taxation, § 265; [5] Malldulllu~, 
§ 15. 
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Ill('rc incidental result of an erroneous ass('ssment of property 
whil'h should not havc been assessed. 
[3] ld.-Remedies of Taxpayer-Conditions of Relief.-The nec('s-
sity of a taxpayer's recourse to the local board of equalization' 
bcfore seeking judicial relief is properly d('termined by the 
nature of the issues in dispute, not by whether nn assessment 
is attacked in part or in tnto. 
[4] ld.-Remedies of Taxpayer-Conditions of Relief.-Where the 
only substantive issue involved is whether Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 107.1, dealing with taxation of possessory interests arising 
out of a lease of exempt property, is unconstitutional on it~ 
face, there is no question of valuation that the local board of 
equalization has special competence to decide, and a taxpayer's 
rccourse to such board i~ not required before seeking a judicial 
determination of the constitutionality of § 107.1. The taxpayer 
could, however, obtain relief by paying under protest and 
suing fOl' recovery (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5136 et scq.), and in 
such an action any question of valuation pursuant to § 107.1 
would be determined by remand to the board of equalization. 
[5] Mandamus-Existence of Other Remedy.-~Iandamus is ordi-
narily denied when petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) 
[6] Taxation-Remedies of Taxpayer-Mandamus.-The fact that 
a taxpayer filed its petition for mandate before the alleged 
erroneous assessment was complete does not affect the adequacy 
of its remedy by payment of taxes under protest and suit for 
recovery thereof. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Joseph M. Maltby, Judge. Reversed. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel county tax assessor to 
cancel tax assessments and reassess petitioner's leasehold 
interests in accordance with Rev. & Tax. Code, § 107.1. Judg-
ment granting writ, reversed. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Alfred Charles 
DeFlon and Carroll H. Smith, Deputy County Counsel for 
Appellants. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, James E. Sabine and Dall 
Kaufmann, Assistant Attorneys General, and Ernest P. Good-
man, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Appellants. 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Mandamus, § 18; Am.Jur., Mandamus, §§ 42, 
52.1. 
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Real & Heal, M. L. Heal and Bruce 1. Hochman for He-
spondent. 
J. Kerwin Rooney, Port Attorney, Port of Oakland, Robert 
G. Cockins, City Attorney (Santa MOllica), O'~lelveny & 
Myers, George l<". Elmendorf, Bennett 'Y. Priest, Lillit'k, 
Geary, McHose, Roethke & Myers, John C. McHose, Holbrook, 
Tarr & 0 'Neill, 'Y. Sumner HoI brook, .J r., Francis II. 0 'N ciU, 
John F. O'Hara, Horton & Foote, Joseph K. Horton, Ralph D. 
Sweeney, Luce, Forward, Kunzel & Scripps, Luce, Forward, 
Hamilton & Scripps, Fred Kunzel, James C. Hewitt, Howard 
H. Taylor, Oakes & Horton and Robert A. Oakes as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Star-Kist Foods, Inc., leases certain land 
and improvements owned by the city of Los Angeles and 
located within its boundaries. Its leases were made before 
our decision in De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 
45 Ca1.2d 546 l~90 P.2d 544], became final and were not ex-
tended or renewed thereafter. Section 107.1 of the Hevenue 
and Taxation Code provides that such leasehold interests 
should be evaluated for purposes of taxation at an amount 
equal to the excf.'SS, if any, of the value of the interest, as 
determined by the formula contained in the De Luz opinion, 
over the present worth of the rentals to become due under the 
lease during its unexpired term. The assessor of Los Angeles 
County, however, assessed Star-Kist's leasehold interests with-
out deducting the present worth of rentals for the unexpired 
terms, on the ground that section 107.1 is void because incon-
sistent with section 1 of article XIII and section 12 of article 
XI of the California Constitution. 
In Forster Shipb1tilding Co. v. C01tnty of Los Angeles, anie, 
p. 450 [6 Cal.Rptr. 24, 353 P.2d 736], we held that the 
last four paragraphs of section 107.1 are valid and that 
the assessor should have deducted the present worth of rentals 
for the unexpired terms of the leases. Unlike plaintiffs in the 
Forster case, however, Star-Kist did not apply to the Los 
Angeles County Board of Equalization for correction of the 
erroneous assessments, Lut sought and obtained a writ of man-
date commanding the assessor to cancel those assessments and 
to reasscss Star-Kist's leasehold interests in accordance with 
section 107.1. 
Defendants contend that Star-Kist's failure to apply to tll\' 
local board of equalization precludes judicial relief. [1] Ordi-
) 
) 
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uarily a taxpayer sceking relief from an errOilt'OUS assessmen~ 
must exhaust available administrative remedies before rc-
sorting to the courts. (City to COl/llty of San Francisco v. 
COl/llty of San Mateo, 36 CaL2d 196, 201 [222 P.2d 860] ; 
ScCII rity-Fil'st NatiollQ.1 Ba1lk v. COllllty of Los A.ngeles, 35 
Ca1.2d 319,320-321 [217 1'.2d 946] ; Dawson y. County of Los 
Angelcs, 15 Ca1.2d 7i, 81 [flb P.2d 495] ; Lucc v. City of San 
Diego, 198 Cal. 405, 406 [245 P. 196].) Prior application to 
the local board of equalization has not been required, how-
ever, in certain cases where the facts were undisputed and 
the property assessed was tax-exempt (Bre:lJ1er v. City of 
Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 72, 79-80 [116 P. 397] ; Parrott (0 Co. 
v. City &; 'County of San Francisco, 131 Cal.App.2d 332, 342 
[280 P.2d 881]), outside the jurisdiction (see Kern River Co. 
v. County of Los Angeles, 164 Cal. 751,755-756 [130 P. 714]), 
or nonexistent (see Pacific Coast Co. v. Wells, 134 Cal. 471, 
473 [66 P. 657]; Associated Oil Co. v. COllnty of Orangc, 
4 Cal.App.2d 5, 9, 11 [40 P.2d 887]). 
In the present case petitioner does not cOllt('nd that its 
leasehold interests should be free of tax, but attacks only the 
assessor's failure to deduct rental values as prescribed by 
section 107.1. Defendants contend that any such attack upon 
an assessment in part rather than ·in toto raises an issue of 
"overvaluation" that must be presented initially to the local 
board. Several cases support defendants' contention. (City 
&; County of San Francisco v. County of San JIateo, 36 Ca1.2d 
196, 201 [222 P.2d 860] ; SOl/thmt California J[ardwood etc. 
Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal.App. 712, 714, 716 
[194 P. 62] ; see Los Angeles etc. Co. v. COllnty of Los Angcles, 
162 Cal: 164, 171 [121 P. 384, 9 A.L.R. 12i7].) [2] In 
Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp. v. Boyd, 43 Ca1.2d 157, 165 
[272 P.2d 16], however, we said: " 'While ill one sense it is 
true that almost any mistake which results in an excessive 
assessment amounts to an overvaluation of the property of a 
taxpayer, we think there is a real and distinC't difference 
behveen those eases in whieh it may properly be said that 
the error is one of overvaluation and those cases in which 
the overvaluation is a mere incidental rl'sult of an erroneous 
assessmC'nt of property which should not have bC'en assessed.' " 
[3] The necessity of recourse to the boardi!=l properly deter-
mined by thc lIatnre of the is~m"s in dif'pnte. and not b~' 
whether an aSSL'ssmcnt is attaeked in part or ill toto. (Par/,-
Richmond Industrial CrJ1'p. v. BrJ!.ld, 43 Ca1.2,1 ]57. 165 [2fl2 
P.2d 16] ; Brcnne1' v. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 72, 71; 
) 
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[54 C.2d 507; 6 CaJ.Hptr. 545. 3:>4 P.Zd 11 
:ill 
[IlG P. :1!)71; .I,w)ciafrrl Oi" CO. Y. C'wIII!! nf Omllge. 4 Cal. 
..\p[l.~(l :-., ] 1 [40 1'.~u 887J; Sl'C Los .1 noeles etc, Corp. '-. 
COllllty 0.; IllS .lllr:"les, 22 CaI.App.2(1-!1S, 422 [71 P.2d 282].) 
[4] The only snhstantiyc issue in the prescnt case is 
whether sPc'tion 107.1 is UllCollstitutional on its facc. As in 
rasps illYoh-ing ollly .11<, qurstion whether property is taxable, 
there is no questioll of \'aluatioll that the local board of equal-
izatioll had special competelll'e to de<:ide. There is 110 dispute 
as to the facts and no possibility that action by the hoard might 
ayoid the necessity of deciding" the constitut iOllal issue or 
modify its nature. (Cf. Security-First National Bank v. 
COllnty of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 31a, 322 [217 1'.2<1946].) 
Under the circumstances, therefore, recourse to the local board 
of cqualization was not required before scrkillg a judicial de-
termination of the constitutionality of section 107.1. 
Star-Kist, howe\'cr, could have obtainl'(l relief by paying' 
its taxes under protest and suing for recovery thereof (Ht'\'. 
& Tax Code, § 5136 ~tseq.), and in such an action any (~ne,,­
tion or valuation pursuant to section 107.1 ",o~lld bl' (It'te]'-
mined by remand to the board or equalization. (S,'I' PI)/'::I( I' 
Shipbuilding Co. v. County of Los Angeles, ante, pp. 450, 460 
[6 Cal.Rptr. 24, 353 P.2d 736].) [5] )1<1I1<1ate is o\'(linill'il.\" 
denied when the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and lHleqllatt' 
remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Phelan v. SUjJcrio)' 
COlll't, 35 Cal.2d 363, 366 [217 P.2d 951] ; see Code Civ. Pro' .. 
§ 1086.) In a number of older cases ('ourts issued man<latc to 
set aside invalid asscssmcnts without considering th€ adequaC';-
of remedies to recover taxes paid. (State Land Settlement 
Board Y. Henderson, 197 Cal. 470 [241 P. 560] ; Glenn-Colusa 
Trr. Dist v. Oh1't, 31 Cal.App.2d 619 [88 P.2d 763] ; Pcoplc v. 
Board of S1(pr:rt'isol'.~, 126 Cal.App. 670 [15 P.2d 209] ; see 
Andel'soH-Coftonu;oocZ Irr. Di.st. v. IlllIl.-kCl't, 13 Cal.2d 191 
[88 P.2d 685).) In more recent ease~, however, the adequacy 
of such remedies has been considered and mandate has been 
denied. (Security-First National Bank v. Board of Super-
visors, 3:i Cal.2d 323, 327 [217 P.2d 9481; Vista hr. Dist. ". 
Board of Supervisors, 32 Cal.2d 477, 478 [196 P.2d 926] ; 
Sherman Y. (/uinn, 31 Ca1.2d 661, 66;) []!)2 P.2d 17].) 
Star-Kist attelllPts to distinguish SI'Clll'it11-Pil'st National 
Bank v. Board of Supervisors, supra, and Vista b·r. Dist. v. 
Board of SU[)(},L'isors, supra, on the gTOlllld that the pditioJl-
ers in those case's sought mandate after the assessments We'J'(~ 
complete. [6] The faet that Star-K ist filed its petitio~l 
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for mandate before the assrssment was complete, ho;vevrr, 
dors not affect the adrquaey of its remedy by payment of 
taxrs under protest and suit for recovery thereof. (See Sher-
man v. Qninll, 31 Ca1.2d 661, 66;) [102 P.2d 17].) 
Star-Kist contends that we should disregard Sherman v. 
Qu inn, sllpra, as being irreconcilablc with Lockhart v. lVolden, 
17 Ca1.2d 628 [111 P.2d 319], and Eisley v. Mohall, 31 Ca1.2d 
637 [192 P.2d 5]. In Lockhart v. Wolden mandate was issued 
to compel the assessor to allow petitioner an exemption as a 
veteran. The remedy by payment of tax and suit to recover 
was held inadequate, inter alia, because at that time a plaintiff 
who recovered wrongfully collected taxes could not recover 
interest for the period prior to judgment. (17 Ca1.2d at 633.) 
He can now recover such interest (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5141), 
and arguments based on Lockhart v. lVoldcn were rejected in 
Sherman v. Quinn. In Eisley v. Mohan mandate was denied 
because the challenged assessments were not erroneous, and 
the adequacy of the rrmedy by payment of taxes under protest 
and suit to recover was not discussed. Star-Kist contends that 
the remedy was impliedly held inadequate since otherwise 
the court would not have reached the merits of the controversy. 
No such implication can be made, however, because Eisley v. 
Mohan was decided on the same day as Sherman v. Quinn, 
which expressly held a comparable remedy to be adequate. 
Star-Kist's reliance on San Diego etc. Ry. v. State Board of 
Equalization, 165 Cal. 560 [132 P. 1044], is misplaced. In 
that case mandamus issued to compel action by the state board 
to preclude local taxation of the petitioner's assets. The writ 
was timely to prevent the collection of local taxes and its denial 
would have compelled the petitioner to sue for recovery of 
taxes from a number of local taxing authorities. No such cir-
cumstances have been shown in the present case. 
The judgment granting a peremptory writ of mandate is 
reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, J., concurred. 
Hespondent's petition for a rehearing was denied August 
24, 1960. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
